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COMMENTS
THE CULMINATION OF THE ABORTION REFORM
MOVEMENT-ROE v. WADE AND DOE v. BOLTON
"We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emo-
tional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views,
even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convic-
tions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's
exposure to the raw edges of human existencq, one's religious training,
one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral
standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement
free of emotion and of predilection."1
This extended introduction is necessary here and was necessary in Roe
v. Wade2 in order to inform the public of the Court's awareness of the
volatile nature of the subject of abortion. With the decisions of Roe v.
Wade3 and Doe v. Bolton,4 the constitutionality of the abortion issue was
decided, and only the moral5 issues remain to be discussed. It is the pur-
pose of this comment to discuss the history of the abortion laws which led
to the climactic decisions in Roe and Doe, and to analyze these decisions
to determine what now controls the abortion decision.
I. HISTORY OF ABORTION AND THE LAw
The inception of abortion6 can be traced to the earliest of civilizations.7
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, at 116 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Id.
4. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5. See Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, 17 WEsTERN ISERV L. Rav. 465
(1965-66). "However convenient, convincing, or compelling the arguments in favor of abortion
may be, the fact remains that the taking of a life, even though it is unborn, cuts out the very
heart of the principle that no one's life, however unwanted and useless it may be, may be
terminated in order to promote the health or happiness of another human being." Id. at 479.
6. BLAcK's LAW DICToNARY 20 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). As defined in Black's, an abortion is
the expulsion of the foetus at a period of utero-gestation so early that it has not acquired the
power of sustaining an independent life.
7. See, e.g., Niswander, MedicalAbortion Practices in the United States, in ABORTION AND
THE LAW 37, 38-40 (D. Smith ed. 1967); Devereaux, A Typological Study of Abortion in 350
Primitive, Ancient, and Pre-Industrial Societies, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 97-152 (H. Rosen
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The Greek and Roman civilizations regarded abortion as a sound policy for
population control." However, this rationale soon began to conflict with the
emerging Christian movement which assailed as infanticide the act of
abortion.' "As articulated by early Christianity and the Roman Catholic
Church, the reasoning lay within two precepts: (1) The doctrine of 'original
sin' suggested that an unbaptized human who dies will never attain com-
plete salvation; (2) that the merging of soul and body created a human
being."'" This latter precept sowed the seeds for our modern day contro-
versy.
It is well established that at common law an abortion before "quicken-
ing"" was not an indictable offense.' 2 However, there is no absolute author-
ity as to whether an abortion of a quick fetus at common law was a felony,
or even a lesser crime.'3
The early English statutory response to this problem was Lord Ellenbor-
ough's Act'4 in 1803, which made abortion of a quick fetus a capital crime
but provided for lesser penalties where an abortion was performed before
quickening.15
Initially, American law generally incorporated the English common law
and did not proscribe abortion during early stages of pregnancy. However,
ed. 1967). For a further and all encompassing survey of the history of the laws of abortion,
see B. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAW 11-28 (1966).
8. L. LADER, ABORTION 76 (1966).
9. Id.
10. See Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 285 at 293-94 (1966).
11. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1261 (24th ed. 1965).
"Quickening" has been defined as the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero,
appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy.
12. E. COKE, INSTITUTES mI *50; 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, c. 31, § 16 (1762);
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-130; M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 433 (1847). For
discussions of the role of the quickening concept in English common law, see LADER, supra
note 8 at 78; Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, J. CRIN. L.C. & P.S. 84 (1968).
13. See 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (S. Thorne ed. 1968);
Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations (pt. 2), 49 GEO. L.J. 395, 431
(1961).
14. 43 Geo. 3, c. 58.
15. See DICKENS, supra note 7, at 23-24.
It becomes evident that the pre- and post-quickening distinction of the common law was
maintained by these early statutes which provided for capital punishment for abortions
performed after quickening and for a lesser punishment for those performed prior to quicken-
ing.
16. Connecticut was the first state to enact abortion legislation in 1821. See CONN. STAT.,
Tit. 20, § 14 (1821). Compare the New York statutory enactment in 1829 which was to serve
as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. See N.Y. REv. STAT., pt. IV, ch. 1, Tit. II, Art.
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by the mid-19th century, for various reasons,'7 restrictive abortion laws
similar to those found in numerous states today were enacted.' 8 The over-
riding disadvantage of such laws was that they permitted abortion in only
one situation-to save the life of the mother." These strict laws actually
resulted in numerous deaths of women who relied on a thriving illegal
abortion business."0 Many of these early laws remained in force in the vast
majority of states2' until 1967, when some legislatures began to respond to
the cry for reform.2 2
Those who advocated restrictive abortion laws and their continued exist-
ence relied upon three arguments. Some urged that they were a part of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct.2 Others con-
tended that criminal abortion laws were necessary to protect the health of
1, § 9, at 661, and Tit. VI, § 21, at 694 (1829). See also, Harper, Abortion Laws in the United
States, in ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 189-92 (Calderone ed. 1958).
17. See LADER, supra note 8, at 86. "At that time in our history medical science was stymied
by infections that made almost any surgery fatally dangerous." See also, State v. Murphy,
27 N.J.L. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1858) "... its abortion law was not to prevent the procuring of
abortions so much as to protect the life and health of the mother against the possibly fatal
consequences of an attempted abortion." Id. at 114.
It is obvious that chief among these various reasons was to protect the health and safety of
the mother.
18. It was during the mid-19th century that a statute which proscribed abortion for any
purpose, with only one exception-to save the life of the mother, was enacted in Texas. That
statute has undergone few changes and was therefore under attack in Roe v. Wade.
19. American courts have generally interpreted this exception by following the rule of Rex
v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687., where the jury was instructed that a woman need not be close
to death before her pregnancy could be lawfully terminated, and that in any case, a woman's
longevity would most likely be shortened by serious injury, though noting that this defense
would not be available to the professional abortionist. Id.
It is also important to note that it is this type of statute which was challenged in Texas in
Roe.
20. Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status and Prognosis, 21 CASE W. Rxs. L. REv. 521 at
529 (1970).
21. "It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitu-
tion, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less
disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a
woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy then than she does in
most States today." 410 U.S. 113 at 140.
22. Regarding the events which resulted in these reforms, see generally N.Y. Times, April
30, 1967, at 60, col. 1 (city ed.) (Colo. act); id., May 9, 1967, at 36, col. 4 (N.C. act); id., June
14, 1967, at 19, col. 1 (city ed.) (Calif. act).
23. See, e.g., YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (N.J. 1972); Abele v. Markle, 342
F. Supp. 800, 805-806 (Conn. 1972) (Newman, J., concurring in result), appeal docketed, No.
72-56; Walsingham v. State, 250 So. 2d 857, 863 (Fla. 1971) (Ervin, J., concurring); State v.
Gadicke, 43 N.J.L. 86, 90 (1881). It appears very few adherents have taken this argument
seriously, including the plaintiffs in Roe and Doe.
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the mother since the procedure was regarded as quite hazardous. 4 Modern
medical achievements render this second contention invalid as mortality
rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal,
appear to be as low or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. 5 Despite
this fact, the state still retains a definite interest in protecting the health
of a woman should an abortion be proposed at a later stage of pregnancy
when the procedure is more hazardous. The final justification for these
laws seems to be the state's interest or duty in protecting prenatal life. 2
For many years these arguments seemed to be sufficient to justify the
retention of restrictive abortion laws. However, a growing outcry for reform
resulted in an escalating attack upon these restrictive statutes. 7
There was much evidence in the preceding decade of an increasing
awareness of the need for abortion reform.28 Upon the recognition by a large
number of the population that an abortion could safely be performed, it
was realized that strict statutes did nothing but prevent competent physi-
cians from acting. Public pressure was applied in the hope of attaining
some legislative response. One result of this public response was the inclu-
sion of an abortion section in the Model Penal Code adopted by the Ameri-
24. See C. HAAGENSEA & W. LLOYD, A HUNDRED YEARS OF MEDICINE 19 (1943). See also
Robert E. Hall, Abortion Laws: A Call For Reform, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 584 (1969). "Thus it
would appear that our forbearers narrowly restricted the practice of abortion primarily to
protect pregnant women from the risks of surgery; and rightly so, for the risk of even hospital
abortions in the nineteenth century was formidable." Id. at 585.
25. Abortion Mortality, 20 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 208, 209 (June 12, 1971) (U.S. Dept.
of HEW, Public Health Service) (New York City); Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abor-
tions, 1963-1968, 59 STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING 5, 7 (1970). See also LADER, supra note 8, at
17-23.
26. With this proposition comes the very arguable point concerning the complex medical
and legal theories of when a new human life is present. See generally R. Drinan, The Inviola-
bility of the Right to be Born, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 107 (D. Smith ed. 1967); Louisell,
Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233
(1969).
27. "Clearly, these statutes restrict the freedom of the woman who desires an abortion and
the doctor who may be willing to treat her. By restricting her freedom these laws appear to
infringe upon her constitutional right of privacy, the doctor-patient relationship, and-at
least in the case of a married woman-the family relationship. The contention may be made,
however, that the fetus also has certain constitutonal rights which require protection." Luis
Kutner, Due Process of Abortion, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1968-69).
28. During this time many people were beginning to realize that an abortion might prevent
the psychological trauma that victims of a rape might experience.
It was also becoming quite obvious to many that an abortion could prevent the physical
and mental pain and suffering that all parties undergo in the birth of a deformed child; or
perhaps be an adequate method to control the spiraling population. These are some of the
numerous reasons which lead people to question if an abortion should not be allowed under
proper circumstances.
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can Law Institute."9 Many states" have since enacted new statutes pat-
terned after this Code which allows an abortion in three situations:
1. When necessary to protect the life or health of the mother;
2. When there is a substantial risk that the child will be born defective; and
3. If the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.3'
A practical analysis of this Model Penal Code revealed that even its
liberalized provisions remained too restrictive. Although it eliminated the
choice between childbirth or maternal death, and reduced the number of
births of deformed children and those born as a result of forcible rape or
incest, the Code neither offered a complete solution to the growing popula-
tion crisis nor deterred women from submitting to dangerous and illegal
abortions,32 since it failed to establish adequate guidelines by which a
physician could counsel his patient regarding an abortion. Additionally,
the constitutional issues raised by these statutes remained undecided.
Thus, another method of reform would have to achieve the demands of the
public.33
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
This Code provides that one who willfully and without justification aborts a pregnant
woman during the first twenty-six weeks of pregnancy commits a felony of the third degree.
Beyond the twenty-sixth week, it is a felony of the second degree. This illustrates the distinc-
tion based on the time of quickening.
An abortion is allowed by a licensed physician under the following circumstances:
(1) If the physician believes that there is a substantial risk to the mother's health or
that her mental health would severely deteriorate if pregnancy were to continue; or
(2) If the child would be born seriously crippled in mind or body; or
(3) If the pregnancy was the result of forcible rape or incest.
30. Fourteen states have adopted some form of the ALI statute. See ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-303 to 41-310 (Supp. 1971); CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25955.5
(Supp. 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to 40-2-53 (Cum. Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE
ANN., Tit. 24 § 1790-1793 (Supp. 1972); FLORIDA LAW OF APRIL 13, 1972 c. 72-196, 1972 FLA.
SisS. LAW SERV., pp. 380-382; GA. CODE §§ 26-1201 to 26-1203 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3407 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 43, §§ 137-139 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223
(Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1 to 40A-5-3 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1
(Supp. 1971); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 435.405 to 435.495 (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82 to 16-
89 (1962 and Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1972).
31. See generally Zad Leavy and Jerome M. Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis,
Therapeutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OoO STATE L.J. 647 (1966).
32. The annual income from illegal abortions has been estimated at over $350,000,000 and
they are considered to be the third largest criminal activity in the United States, surpassed
only by gambling and narcotics. See D. LowE, ABORTION AND THE LAW 3-5 (1966).
33. It is interesting to note that later in 1972 the American Bar Association reacted by
approving the Uniform Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the preceding
August by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 58 A.B.A.J. 380 (1972).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS UPON THESE STATUTES
Initially, the courts were slow to respond to the pro abortion movement.
However, "[als the trend toward liberal interpretation of the Constitu-
tion has gathered momentum, protagonists of abortion reform, riding on a
wave of public sentiment, have met with increasing success in the
courts. ' '31 The current reform movement was triggered by a growing belief
that a pregnant woman, after consulting with her physician, should be
allowed to decide if her pregnancy should be terminated, and that this
decision should not be controlled by any social or moral norm.3 5 As dis-
cussed previously, legislative abortion liberalization was neither sufficient
nor entirely successful.36 As a result, the proponents of reform turned to the
courts in their attempt to declare all restrictions upon the right to abort
unconstitutional. With the trend of court decisions in their favor and much
public sentiment at their back, these groups soon began to experience long
awaited courtroom victories. 37 As a basis of attack upon these statutes, the
plaintiffs relied upon the vagueness of the statute, or overbreadth and
abridgement of rights, 3 and a woman's fundamental constitutional right
to privacy in matters relating to marriage, sex and family. 9
A. Vagueness
An early and unsuccessful attack on the vagueness of an abortion statute
was People v. Rankin," in which the defendant claimed that the statu-
tory phrase "to procure the miscarriage of such woman"', failed to inform
34. Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 521,
536 (1970).
35. See Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730 (1968).
36. For a discussion of legislative reform and the New York law, see Hall, The Abortion
Revolution, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1970, at 112.
37. See Moyers, A bortion Laws; A Study In Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 237 (1970).
38. E.g., United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969). See also Abele v.
Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D.C. Conn. 1972), appeal pending; Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385
(N.D. Ill. 1971), appeal pending; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Kan. 1972);
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S.1 (1970);
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970).
Cases which have sustained state statutes include: Crossea v. Attorney General, 344 F.
Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972), appeal pending; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), appeal pending; State v. Munson, - S.D.
__ 201 N.W. 2d 123 (1972), appeal pending.
39. These cases include Belous, Vuitch, and Babbitz, supra note 38. See also Griswold v.
Connecticutt, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. 10 Cal. 2d 198, 74 P.2d 71 (1937).
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1970).
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him with reasonable certainty of the act prohibited and was therefore
unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected the defendant's contentions,
citing two law dictionary definitions of the "procurement of miscarrage"
as "the criminal act of destroying the fetus at any time before birth is
termed, 42 and concluding that the statute's phrase "was sufficiently ex-
plicit to inform persons of common intelligence and understanding of the
acts which were prohibited."43 The plaintiff was more successful in People
v. Belous" in which the court reasoned that the statutory language was so
pervaded with uncertainty that those subject to criminal sanctions were
forced to speculate as to its meaning, and held that the California abortion
statute offended constitutional safeguards against unreasonably vague and
overbroad legislation.45
The abortion statute in the District of Columbia, which allowed an
abortion only "when necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or
health,"46 was rejected as unconstitutionally vague in United States v.
Vuitch.4 7 The court concluded that "[t]he word 'health' is not defined and
in fact remains so vague in its interpretation and practice under the act
that there is no indication whether it includes varying degrees of mental
as well as physical health. There is no clear standard to guide either the
doctor, the jury or the court." Although the proponents of reform enjoyed
some success with this approach, there was some judicial disagreement49
which served as a warning that perhaps another constitutional avenue of
attack should be considered.
B. Rights of the Mother to Decide Whether or Not to Bear Children
It is pregnant women whose rights and interests are most affected since
illegal abortions kill or maim thousands of women each year.
42. 10 Cal. 2d at 202, 74 P.2d at 73.
43. Id.
44. 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
45. See P. KAUPER, CONsTrruToNAL LAW: CASES Am MATERALS 856, n. 4 (3d ed. 1966).
Kauper explores how a criminal statute may be void if it "either on its face or as authorita-
tively construed, while reaching conduct that may lawfully be punished, is nevertheless so
broad in its sweep that it may be used to punish constitutionally protected conduct." Id.
46. The statute in question was originally enacted as part of the District of Columbia Code
of 1901, and it remained in effect until this case.
47. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
48. Id. at 1034.
49. See note 38, supra, which indicates the cases contra to those which found in favor of
this vagueness argument.
50. It has been estimated that illegal abortions may take as many as 5,000 lives annually.
See Leavy and Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52 (1964).
1973]
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[Tihe numerical inconsistency between the number of instances in which
abortion is sought and received and the number of instances in which it is
"legally" performed refutes any pretense that statutory prohibition of abor-
tion achieves or can ever achieve its aim of safeguarding the prospective
mother.5'
The paramount issue needing clarification was whether a woman has a
constitutionally protected right to make an abortion decision.
The right to freedom, the right of an individual to be left alone by the
government was guaranteed by Olmstead v. United States. 2 In expanding
this basic right to freedom, guaranteed by Olmstead, the Supreme Court
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. The Court has
found the roots of this right in the first amendment, Stanley v. George;
5 3
in the fourth and fifth amendments, Terry v. Ohio,54 Katz v. United
States,5  and Boyd v. United States;56 in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut;7 in the ninth amendment, Griswold v.
Connecticut;" and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section
of the fourteenth amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska.- Thus the question to
be decided was whether this guaranteed zone of privacy included the right
of a woman to make the decision to abort, subject, of course, to certain
valid and compelling state interests.
Many writers agree that Griswold v. Connecticut0 most significantly
affected the restrictive abortion statutes. The issue there was the constitu-
tionality of a Connecticut statute6 ' which outlawed the use of contracep-
tives and punished physicans who aided and abetted such use.12 The Court
in holding this statute unconstitutional recognized the right to privacy as
an independent constitutional right. It stated that the marital relationship
involved in the case was a relationship "within the zone of privacy created
51. E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VIcTIMs 25, 28 (1965).
52. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
53. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
54. 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
55. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
59. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-52 and 54-196 (1958 rev.).
62. See Lucas, supra note 35. "Much like the abortion statutes, this anti-contraceptive
measure was publicly ignored and symbolized only the timidity and election-mindedness of
lawmakers." Id. at 763.
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by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" 3 and was therefore not
subject to unjustified governmental intrusion. As has frequently been
argued, the issues raised in Griswold concerning contraception so closely
parallel those raised by abortion that it too must similarly be protected
from transgression by the state. 4 This has led to a logical conclusion
reached by many courts,"5 that this right of privacy, however based, is
broad enough to cover the abortion decision:
The result of these decisions is the evolution of the concept that there is a
certain zone of individual privacy which is protected by the Constitution.
Unless the State has a compelling subordinating interest that outweighs the
individual rights of human beings, it may not interfere with a person's mar-
riage, home, children, and day-to-day living habits. This is one of the most
fundamental concepts that the Founding Fathers had in mind when they
drafted the Constitution.86
Assuming that this right to privacy does encompass the decision of abor-
tion, the remaining question is whether this right can be superseded by a
compelling state interest. Where certain fundamental rights are involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified
only by a compelling state interest, 7 and that legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."
As to what might exist today as a compelling state interest, the state will
contend, among others, (1) the discouragement of nonmarital sexual rela-
tions, (2) the protection of the woman's health, and (3) the protection of
the unborn fetus. The courts should have little trouble disposing of these
arguments, with the exception of the issue of the protection of the unborn
63. Griswold at 485.
64. See note 34, at 545, supra.
65. Babbitz v. McCann, supra note 38, drew this conclusion as the federal court held that
the state may not deprive a woman of her private choice of whether or not to bear an
unquickened fetus. Following Griswold, the court pointed out that the Bill of Rights contains
both penumbral and specific guarantees that protect one's home and life from governmental
intrusion.
66. Comment, The Right To Privacy, Does It Allow A Woman the Right to Determine
Whether to Bear Children, 20 AM. U.L. Rav. 136, at 139 (1970-71). Former Supreme Court
Justice Tom C. Clark summarized the holding of the Court in Griswold and other cases which
expanded the right to privacy into a full-fledged independent constitutional right.
67. See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
68. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940).
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fetus.6 9 If the courts should regard the unborn fetus as a person, the state
would be justified in protecting its right to life.10
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES THE ISSUE
In Roe v. Wade,7 a pregnant single woman, Jane Roe, challenged the
constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion statutes72 which made it
a crime to procure an abortion, or to attempt one, except for one procured
or attempted on the basis of medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. The case was extremely important as similar statutes
were in existence in a majority of states.73 The plaintiff contended that the
Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of
personal privacy, protected by the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth
amendments. 74 In response to this, the State of Texas argued that its
determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after concep-
tion constituted a compelling state interest which justified state control of
abortion by legislation.
In Doe v. Bolton, 5 Mary Doe, a married pregnant woman challenged the
constitutonality of a recently enacted Georgia abortion statute. 7 This law
proscribed an abortion except where performed by a duly licensed Georgia
69. Of those who oppose a liberalization of our current abortion laws, the primary argument
is the idea of the right of the fetus to be born, and the fact that the law does afford some
rights to unborn children. See comment, AM. U.L. REv. supra, note 66.
70. Should a state argue that a fetus is entitled to fourteenth amendment rights as a
person,then that state would face a dilemma as no single state prohibits abortions under all
circumstances. An exception always exists. See note 84, infra as the Court decided the unborn
fetus was not a person under the Constitution.
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. TEXAS REV. CrIM. STAT., Arts. 1191-94, and 1196.
73. AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); CONN. PUB. AcT No. 1 (May 1972 special ses-
sion) (in 4 Conn. Leg. Serv. 677 (1972), and CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 53-29, 53-30 (1968)
(or unborn child); IDAHO CODE § 18-601 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 23-1 (1971); IND.
CODE § 35-1-58-1 (1971); IOWA CODE § 701.1 (1971); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.020 (1962); LA.
REV. STAT. § 37:1285 (6) (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 51 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. c. 272, § 219 (1970); MINN. STAT. § 617.18 (1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.100 (1969);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-401 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-405 (1964); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.220 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1
(1969); N.D. CERT. CODE §J 12-25-01, 12-25-02 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16
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physician, and necessitated by, in his best clinical judgment, the danger
of continued pregnancy to the pregnant woman's life or health. The statute
also made exceptions in those cases where the fetus would likely be born
with serious defects; or the pregnancy resulted from rape. In addition to a
requirement that the patient be a Georgia resident, three procedural condi-
tions had to be met under the state law: (1) the abortion be performed in
a hospital accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals; (2) the procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion commit-
tee; and (3) the performing physician's judgment be confirmed by an inde-
pendent examination of the woman by two other licensed physicians. Un-
like the Texas statute which was old and typical of those found in most
states, this was a new legislative product 7 which reflected the influences
of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and tech-
niques and of new thinking about an old issue. 8
The plaintiff in Doe contended that this statute abridged her rights of
privacy and liberty in matters related to family, marriage, and sex and
thus deprived her of the right to choose whether to bear children. She
grounded her contention on the charge that the Georgia abortion statute
violated her rights guaranteed her by the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, that it denied
her equal protection and procedural due process, and that it deterred hos-
pitals and doctors from performing abortions" since it was
unconstitutionally vague.
As the two cases basically dealt with the same issues, they were decided
as companion cases, thereby establishing a precedent to be followed by all
the states. The Supreme Court concluded in both, relying in part on the
earlier decisions discussed in this comment,"0 that the right of personal
privacy included the decision to have an abortion, but that this right was
not unqualified and had to be weighed against the important state inter-
ests in the regulation of abortion.' Not only does the state have an impor-
tant and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the
pregnant woman, but it has still another important and legitimate interest
in protecting potentiality of human life. These separate and distinct inter-
ests grow in substantiality as the woman approaches term, and at some
point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling."
The Court balanced the constitutionally guaranteed right of the woman
against the "compelling" interests of the state in reaching its conclusion.
77. See note 30, supra.
78. 410 U.S. at 116.
79. 410 U.S. at 186.
80. See note 66, supra.
81. 410 U.S. 113, 152-164 (1973).
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It decided that a state criminal abortion statute of the Texas type, which
excepts from criminal prosecution only a life saving procedure on behalf
of the mother without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition
of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. Furthermore, recognizing the
"compelling" state interests involved, the Court concluded that for the
stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician. For the stage subsequent to ap-
proximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abor-
tion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. And
finally, for the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in promoting its
interests in the potentiality oflhuman life, may, if it chooses, regulate and
even proscribe abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-
cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."2 Doe
also decided that various procedural conditions set forth in the Georgia
statute were violative of the fourteenth amendment.3
These two cases are landmark decisions which have finally established
specific guidelines upon which states may rely in the regulation of the
abortion procedure. Thus, the limited right of the woman to decide upon
an abortion is now firmly embedded in our constitutional law, subject only
to state regulation in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy when
the state's "compelling" interests may prevail and result in valid regula-
tions. 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether one agrees with these decisions or not, the Court should be
commended for its scholarly work in undertaking such a difficult issue.
Despite the fact that one's moral and religious beliefs may cause disagree-
ment, it should be conceded that the Court's decision on abortion is consti-
tutionally sound. Although most issues are now conclusively decided,
remaining unanswered is a father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional
context, in the abortion decision." However, the proponents of less restric-
82. Id.
83. 410 U.S. 179, 191-201 (1973).
84. The Court also decided that the word "person," as used in the fourteenth amendment,
did not include the unborn. Id. at 156-159. See also McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hosp.,
340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 31
N.Y.2d 194, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 286 N.E.2d 881 (1972). Thus the rights of the unborn fetus
are not subject to Constitutional protection.
85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165, n.67.
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tive abortion laws have been awarded with what they have impatiently
requested, the established constitutional right to make an abortion deci-
sion.'6
W.D.B.
86. In light of these decisions many states, including Virginia, will find their abortion laws
unconstitutional.
Virginia made an effort to follow the guidelines established by these cases when the legisla-
ture attempted to enact House Bill No. 1698 (Jan. 24, 1973). However, our abortion law
remains unconstitutional since the proposal failed to pass.
